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commitn1ent to peace 
South An1erica's lTIotivations to 
contribute to peace operations 
A,tUTO C. Sotmnayor Velazquez 
The decision to deploy troops overseas to observe, keep or enforce peace 
is not an easy One. Peace operalions are ditTicult to sustain. War can break 
out again at any time and belligerent groups can attack peacekeepers. 
Conflicting interests and mistrust between the parties involved can spoil 
peace agJ:eements. 1 The fact that peace is so difficult to achieve raises an 
interesting puzzle for those interested in analyzing the supply side of 
peace operations. If peace missions are so hard to maintain, why would 
any state want to contribute troops to United Nations (UN) peace efforl~? 
This chapter will empirically analyze why South American nations con-
lribute to peace operations (PKOs). In fact, South America's participation 
in UN PKOs has generated interest in Latin American foreign policy. The 
region's engagement in Haiti, predominantly through the United Nations 
St.."lbilization Mission there (MINUSTAH), has been hailed as a "coming-
out party" for the South American community. Through MINUSTAH, 
nine Latin AmezicaJl nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) have broadened their military 
and diplomatic cooperation, all while contributing to the effort of con-
structing a difficult peace in the Caribbean island nation. 
Yet, strictly speaking, South America is not a newcomer to peacekeep-
ing trends. Many of these Western Hemisphere countries were involved in 
the growth of peace observation missions in Suez and Kashmir. Moreover, 
these states have increased their commitments to UN efforts worldwide 
since the end of the Cold War era. Specifically, Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay have gained, at least, 25 years of peace operations experience. 
Why do these states supply blue helmets? What domestic factors explain 
their peacekeeping commitments? 
Conventional explanations for participation in peace operations 
(PKOs) include national security interests, international system power 
dynamics, middle-power explanations and nonnative considerations.~ This 
chapter takes a different approach, by exploring the relationship beuveen 
domestic democratization and the commitment of troops to PKOs. 
Indeed, since a considerable number of South American peace operations 
participants come from democratizing and transitional states-states with 
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fresh memories of military authoritarianism-it is not surprising that their 
commitment to these operations is generally driven by domestic impera-
tives as well. 
As Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse argue, democratization 
is an especially poten t impetus for states to join international institutions, 
especially since these types of states have a difficult time sustaining the 
liberal reforms needed to consolidate their own democracies.:> Uncertainty 
is indeed the defining characteristic of democratization, involving a 
process of "undetermined social change, [and] large-scale transformations 
which occur when there are insufficient structural Of behavioral -para-
meters to guide and predict the outcome.'''1 
My contention is that one key impetus to join UN peace missions origi-
nates in the selfsame domestic political arena. Although states' motiva-
tions to participate in UN PKOs vary substantially from case to case, I 
argue that South American democratizing nations have committed them-
selves to peace operations for three main reasons: international signaling, 
domestic reform and monetary incentives. By signaling I mean an inter-
national commiunen t to show to the rest of the world that irreversible 
domestic change and fundamental foreign policy re-alignment have 
occu rred. It represen ts, in short, a declaration that the state is indeed 
building a new identity that will permit future access to additional inter-
national organizations or security communities in which democratic prac-
tices are the nonn. 5 
On the other hand, civilian leaders in democratizing states may con-
clude that performing- peacekeeping duties will change their soldiers' pro-
fessional self-image via international socialization, leading perhaps to 
some kind of militalY reform. UN peace operations are thus a service pro-
vided by a donor counlly, but they are also a schoolhouse where a demo-
cratizing state's armed forces might internalize new roles, doctrines and 
social norms. Finally, peace operations can provide an incentive to use 
such operations as a source of income for the milital),. Depending on the 
level of national income and militalY spending, peacekeeping resources 
can be used by democratizing states to cover individual militaI)' salaries, 
sustain operational costs and perhaps even purchase military equipment 
during periods of budgetmy uncertainty. Having said this, it is important 
to point out that these three motivations (signaling, military refonn and 
economic incentives) are not always present at the same time, nor are they 
necessarily constant. In fact, they have evolved and varied over time and 
from case to case. 
This chapter traces in depth the participation of Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay in UN PKOs. It emphasizes various time sequences of events and 
offers an assessment of the causal relationship between countries' commit-
ments to UN PKOs and the democratization trends we see within them 
domestically. Argentina is the first case study presented here as, of the 
three countries analyzed, its theoretical motivations for participating in 
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these operations were the strongest-it needed to send positive signals 
about its intentions to the international community, take steps to reform 
its military and exploit the financial benefits offered by peace missions. 
The second section analyzes Brazil's reasons for participating in UN PKOs, 
largely defined by the need to signal international commitment and 
obtain prestige. Finally, the third section of this chapter focuses on 
Uruguay, a country whose commitment to peace operations is driven 
primarily by economic considerations. 
Argentina's engagement in peace operations: signaling, 
military reform and economic incentives 
Argentina's proactive approach to peace operations first began in 1991, 
when two Argentine frigates with 450 Navy personnel were deployed to the 
Pel·sian Gulf.li In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Buenos Aires pledged a 
total of over 15,000 individual soldiers to participate in more than five 
PKOs worldwide from 1992 to 2001. In total, about 40 percent of the COUl1-
try's commissioned officers gained some kind of peace operations experi-
ence during this period, thus making Argentina the most active Latin 
American troop contributor and one of the top five UN troop contrib-
utors between 1992 and 1996.7 
Such a trajectory may initially seem insignificant. After all, the country 
was merely fulfilling its responsibilities as a founding member of the UN. 
This was of course no accident. Argentina's engagement in UN PKOs 
clearly coincided with the government's efforts to realign the country 
internationally and to restructure its restive armed forces (see Diamint in 
this volume). In this first phase, therefore, Buenos Aires wanted to broad-
cast its new role as a democratic player on the international stage, to 
promote and consolidate internal political and military reform and to 
defray the costs of its military institutions. 
The country's external image was damaged by the legacy of its authOlit-
arian past (1976-1982) and its aftermath (the Falklands/Malvinas war). In 
this context, peacekeeping participation became a prime way for Argenti-
na's emergent democratic government to send clear and far-reaching 
signals of its commitment to change. The government, in particular, 
sought to participate in PROs in order to secure greater US support and 
international exposure. The move expressed not only tacit support for US 
policies abroad, but a tacit alignment with Washington.8 
On a broader level, Argentine engagement in UN peace operations was 
also a way to improve and redefine the abysmal human rights record the 
country had acquired while under military rule. \%ile Argentina could 
have used regional organizations to signal its new resolve, its leaders deter-
mined that the UN was the most appropriate forum for this, in part 
because it had come to embody an unstinting commitment to human 
rights norms and values. As Rut Diamint argues, "[t]he Argentine 
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government in Buenos Aires was not merely interested. in rees.tablishin?" 
cordial relations with its North, South and Central Amencan nelghbors;H 
also had a broader desire to reconnect to the international community."9 
Additionally, the impulse to participate in peace operations coincided 
with the government's desperate need to both shepherd and reform a 
repeatedly insubordinate military. In fact, between 1982 and the .early 
19905, Argentina's armed forces experienced a period of profeSSIOnal 
crisis characterized by defeat, scarcity, exclusion, fragmentation and pun-
ishme11l. In this sense, peace operations not only enabled Arge11lina lo 
signal its dependability as an international actor, but also to begin rehabil-
itating its armed forces by exposing large numbers of its troops to out-of-
area missions conducted by multinational forces. The government thus 
began deploying observers, units and even full battalions lll to various UN 
PE.os. Argentine military officers became ubiquitous peacekeepers in 
Central America, Africa and Europe. 
Similarly, in [his initial phase, monetary considerations played a key 
role in Argentina's pursuit of a UN peace operations role. Budget reduc-
lions had intensified the internal disorder of the armed forces, almost 
causing institutional paralysis. Peacekeeping participation provided both a 
political and an economic opportunity to resolve various tradeoffs. Argen-
tina thus used peacekeeping resources as "carrots" to reduce military 
unrest and make it easier for the military to cope with economic scarcity. 
The salaries and operational costs of troop deployments to UN missions, 
for example, were funded by the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, which saw the missions as an integral part of the 
nation's foreign policy. At the same time, the Argentine government 
usually provided its peacekeepers with a monthly allowance of US$l,OOO 
dollars and an additional 25 percent pay increase. I I 
Nevertheless, the dynamism described above did not last. By 1996, 
troop commiunents began to decline and fewer soldiers were sent abroad. 
In 1997, while President Menem was still in power, the counny began to 
experience the first symptoms of what would become a severe economic 
crisis, which subsequently prompted the government to reduce its force 
levels abroad from almost 3,000 in 1995 to 1,464 in 1996, to less than 600 
by 2000. As Cynthia A. Watson argues, 
What could go into peace operations for a military that cannot be 
completely funded by external sources is money that can go into 
keeping Argentines off the streets and from looting stores and busi-
ness establishments.... It would appear that peace operations will 
remain a low level of interest for the Republic as long as the severe 
economic turmoil persists.12 
This phase was thus shadowed by the economic uncertainties that 
prompted Argentina to reduce its international commitment to peace 
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operations. The armed forces were not considered responsible for this 
crisis and did not intervene, but the absence of political leadership once 
again forced them to focus their attention on the domestic turmoil that 
sUlTounded them. Argentina embarked upon a new peace operations tra-
jectory in 2004, once the political and economic crises had died down. A 
new impetus for the country to send international signals was fueled by 
President Nestor Kirchner's request for Congressional permission to 
deploy a full battalion and a unit of observers to the ON mission in Haili, 
tot<1.ling 1,103 soldiers. This was the first large deployment after the crisis 
and the third largest national contingent in Haiti from a South American 
nation. 
What was ArgeI1lina trying to signal? The decision making process 
behind this large deployment was complex, since at the time Kirchner 
had little interest in foreign policy matters and was heavily focused on 
the domestic agenda. However, Defense Minister Jose Pampuro and 
Foreign Affairs Minister Rafael Bielsa convinced an apathetic :Kirchner 
to use peace operations as a foreign policy tool to signal two goals. First, 
Argentina increased its peacekeeping commitment in order to promote 
subregional military cooperation with its South American neighbors, 
among whom Brazil and Chile were the most important. In fact, :Kirch-
ner requested Congressional authorization not only to deploy troops 
abroad, but also to allow Argentine forces to cooperate actively with 
Chilean and Brazilian soldiers in the field. J3 Although the country's 
diplomatic relations with Chile and Brazil had been quite stable and 
peaceful, militaly-military cooperation was very limited among these 
South American nations; thus peace operations also served as a means of 
signaling commitment to regional defense integration by compelling the 
armed forces to participate injoint peace efforts. 
This ''las a particularly sensitive issue for Argentine-Chilean relations, 
given their historical mistrust and differences over sovereignty and ter-
ritory; these had almost led to a war in 1978 over the Beagle Channel. In 
that sense, a joint peacekeeping force with regional neighbors provided 
an important foreign policy mechanism with which to signal the arrival 
of a new era of regional relations. This culminated in the creation of an 
Argentine-Chilean binational force for peace operations, known as 
Brigada Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross Brigade), which, according to 
Diamint, "opened up the prospect of further defense cooperation and 
helped to definitively end mutual conflict scenarios."14 
Second, Ministers Pampuro and Bielsa persuaded the President to use 
Argentina's active role in Haiti as an opportunity to establish a new divi-
sion of labor between the region's middle powers (Brazil) and the US. In 
the view of these decisionmakers, peace operations would permit a 
minimum level of cooperation with the George W. Bush administration, 
with which Argentina had a tense and difficult relationship clue to Wash-
ington's steadfast refusal to support a bailout for Argentina. Jf, Hence, 
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peace operations were once again used to signal the country's commi.l-
menl to cooperate, especially when US-Argentine relations were at the~r 
lowest ebb. As of October 2012, Argentina maintains a battalion and an air 
force unit in Haiti and it is still South America's third largest contributor 
to [he UN mission there. 
Brazil as peacekeeper: signaling and reform 
Brazil has traditionally been a major player in the UN system, having 
served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council more times 
than any other countly in the Americas, and surpassed only by Japan at 
the global level. Historically, it has also been one of Latin America's major 
troop contributors, having deployed UN observers and troops to mission~ 
in Sinai, Gaza, Congo, India-Pakistan, Cyprus, Angola and Mozambique. Jfi 
However, it is also important to note that, between 1968 and 1988, 
Brazil decided not to participate in UN peacekeeping, following a similar 
path to that of Argentina and Umguay. This assessment was influenced by 
the military coup of 1964, which effectively installed a dictatorship that 
would last for more than two decades. The military regime had an ambi-
tious agenda, including the development of nuclear weapons, but parti-
cipation in the UN SecUlity Council and PKOs was not part of the plan. li 
Like most bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in South America, Brazilian 
military leaders reasoned that isolationism would silence international crit-
icism of their poor human rights record. 
The return to democracy brought Brazil back to UN politics. As the 
country democratized, the MinislIY of Foreign Affairs (also known as lta-
maraty) increased its presence in the international organization. Demo-
cratization has played an important role in shaping Brazil's multilateral 
policy and its return to peacekeeping affairs has largely been motivated by 
foreign and domestic policy imperatives, in which a perceived need to 
send signals internationally and domestic reform have been the key 
factors. In that sense, Brazil has interesting similarities to Argentina. BUl 
its peace operations tr~ectory is also quite different from its neighbor'S. 
Civil-military relations in Argentina and Brazil differ considerably; unlike 
the Argentine armed forces, the Brazilian military emerged from the trans-
ition to democracy with relative strength. This fact enabled the military, 
and particularly the branch commanders, to formulate defense policy with 
a certain degree of autonomy vis-a.-vis civilian control. IS Hence, the Brazil-
ian armed forces did not face the same economic and mission consu"aints 
suffered by their Argentine counterparts. 
In contrast to Argentina, in Brazil peace operations have been con-
ceived of as a mechanism to help integrate defense and foreign policies, 
which in turn will enable the country to effectively signal its aspiration to 
be considered a global power. Signaling and domestic reform (integra-
tion) thus provided an impetus for Brazil to join UN peace efforts. In its 
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first decade as a democratic state, Brazil pursued a strategy in which in ter-
national signaling was key, given the uncertain nature of the cOuntry's 
domestic politics at the time. While Brazil did not experience a traumatic 
transition to democracy through collapse-a." did Arg·entina-its demo-
cratization was uneven and at times rocky. There was also uncertainly 
about the role of the military. The armed forces continued to exercise 
autonomy and intervened actively in politics during this peIiod. As AlfL'eel 
Stepan and Juan Linz argue, 
on numerous occasions the military unilaterally decided whether or 
not to send military units to quell strikes. Active duty army officers 
continued in control of the National Intelligence Service. None of 
Brazil's controversial nuclear projects were discussed by Congress. The 
military played a major role in setting the boundaries to agrarian 
reform. 19 
So what was Brazil trying to signal? Participation in UN PKOs was part of a 
broader strategy, intended to achieve two related foreign policy goals: 
namely to increase the country's visibility in the UN system after years of 
isolation (see Kenkel on Brazil in this volume); and to encourage the 
internationalization of its economy after decades of imporl substitution. 
First, peace operations were used to signal credibili ty and commitmen t in 
UN politics. As the country democratized, Brazil's foreign ministry 
increased its presence at the UN, publicly reviving the country's age-old 
intention to gain a permanent, veto-endowed position on the UN SeCLuity 
Council. Brazilian diplomats and politicians alike engaged in an inter-
national public relations campaign to push for rapid UN reform, which 
would grant Brazil the desired permanent seat.20 
To signal interest in UN affairs and to demonstrate democratic and 
status credentials, Brazil gradually increased its UN troop contribution in 
the late eighties and early nineties, including larger deployments to 
Mozambique and Angola.~1 These constituted the first deployments of Bra-
zilian combat troops to a foreign country since the end, in 1967, of the 
first UN Emergency Force in the Suez. Interestingly enough, these com-
mitments were made precisely when Brazil was experiencing its worst post-
dictatoIial political and economic crisis. While the forces in Angola and 
Mozambique undoubtedly represented Brazil's largest contingents abroad 
dUling this first phase, the various democratic governments of Brazil 
deployed observers and troops to other UN missions as well, including EI 
Salvador, Guatemala and East Timor.~~ 
By far Brazil's largest troop contributions during this initial period were 
in support of UN missions in Mrica and Asia, including the peace opera-
tions in Angola, East Timor and Mozambique. These contributions reflect 
Brazil's zone of regional projection. With regard to a commitment for 
troop presence, Brazil explicitly chose POrluguese-speaking (Lusophone) 
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Africa and Asia. In total, 4,942 individual Brazilian officers and non-
commissioned officers were sent to participate in UN PKOs in this peliod. 
It is imponal1lto note that, while Brazil was internationally active, it tOO 
behaved vel)' cautiously. Brazilian officials were keenly interested in signal-
ing their il1lention to cooperate with the UN in a democratic era, but not 
at any cost and not in any counl1)'. When the UN requested troops for 
operations in Haiti and the Balkans, Brazil refused to join. During this 
initial phase, Brazil was reluctant to support peace enforcement opera-
tions and was adamantly opposed to the establishment of any force that, 
although designed for traditional peacekeeping, could possibly be drawn 
into peace enforcement, especially in complex emergencies where prevail-
ing conditions verged on chaos.~:l Instead, it opted for observational and 
peacebuilding operations in coul1lries with which it had cultural, linguistic 
and political connections. 
Second, Brazil approached international institutions, like the UN, in 
part because it was also signaling its intention to change its national 
economy and global strategy. Pro-reform politicians in Brazil, such as 
Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, wanted LO 
abandon the nationalist-developmentalisl and isolationist model that had 
been followed by the previous dictatorial regime.~·' A more liberal regime, 
whose trademarks were regional integration and international coopera-
tion, then replaced the old, inward-looking model. In that sense, peace-
keeping participation was an attempt to integrate defense policy into the 
counll)"s new grand strategy. But for Brazil, unlike Argentina, militaI)' 
reform was not the main objective of its signaling strategy. As Thomaz 
Guecles da Costa argues, 
Brazil's international lnilitary presence has not been the subject of 
internal debate, whether as pan of the consideration of foreign policy 
or in specific discussions of the role of the armed forces. Peacekeep-
ing activities are viewed as part of the international role of the 
coun (1)'. ~:, 
Instead, participation in the UN and in other international forums was 
pan of the countIy's broader agenda to reform the national economy, not 
the armed forces. The advent of democracy in itself failed to bring about a 
dramatic transformation of the Brazilian economy, however. So, liberal 
Brazilian leaders designed a foreign policy intended to implement a 
liberal economic regime once and for all by signing international agree-
ments, founding regional institutions and actively participating in existing 
global forums, such as the UN. Regionally, Brazil was pursuing economic 
integration with its neighbors, Argentina and Uruguay, via Mercosur.26 
Globally, it was assuming an active role in multilateral affairs, in an effort 
to project a new international identity via participation in peace opera-
tions, the Security Council and the hosting of the 1992 UN Conference on 
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Environment and Development (also known as the Rio Summit). Scholars 
such as Etel Solingen have branded this the "internationalist revolution" 
in South Amelica, in which liberal politicians (such as Collor and later 
Henrique Cardoso) seized the opportunilY to join international forces to 
address domestic and social agendas.27 Peace operations were thus part of 
a Illuch larger Brazilian foreign policy strategy to embrace international 
forces and heavily engage in international transactions with those who 
shared the same liberal and democratic norms. 
By 1998, Brazilian UN troop contributions had decreased substantially 
from 1,000 to just a token 49 soldiers. Similar to Argentina, Brazil experi-
enced a financial collapse in 1999, leading to a traumatic devaluation of 
the national currency and high inflation rates. This made it extremely dif-
ficult for President Cardoso, a former Foreign Minister and a staunch sup-
porter of Brazil's peacekeeping engagement, to deploy troops abroad. 
Brazil once again deployed troops with the UN in 2004, under the 
administration of Presiden t Luiz Imicio Lula da Silva. In fact, that year Lhe 
country substantially increased its role by sending more than 1,200 sol-
diers to Haiti, a non-Lusophone nation. The decision to deploy Brazilian 
troops there came in response to a formal request li·Olll the US and France 
to assist with the stabilization of the Caribbean nation in the aftermath of 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's controversial ouster as its President.28 In March of 
2004, amidst the political crisis in Haiti, French President Jacques ChinlC 
reportedly asked Lula whether Brazil could assume command of the 
mission.2'J To some extent, the US and France were ll)'ing to persuade 
local and regional stakeholders to participate in the operation in an 
attempt to legitimize the overall enterprise. In the absence of Caribbean 
supporters, they turned to South America. Surprisingly, Lula committed a 
force of over 1,000 soldiers, which facilitated the creation of MINUSTAH 
in Aplil 20M. 
The force appeared to be relatively small, but it had m<!jor symbolic sig-
nificance. In the space of six years (2004-2010),5,960 individual Brazilian 
soldiers participated in MINUSTAH, making it Brazil's largest foreign 
military commitment since UNEF and World War II.30 It is further 
important to note that Brazil was pennanently given the general military 
command of a UN peace operation, initially composed of roughly 7,000 
soldiers and 1,600 police, half of whom came from Latin AmeIican coun-
tIies.31 Moreover, this was the first time that soldiers from the Brazilian 
anned forces were involved in a mission mandated under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, about which Itamaraty had previously expressed reserva-
tions. Finally, President Lula was deploying forces to take over from Alner-
ican and French forces in a Caribbean nation that had few or no linguistic 
or political linkages to Brazil.32 
So, why did Brazil make this ambitious commitment? It did so for two 
main reasons. First, a desire to send signals to the international com-
munity, albeit with a different message from those sent in the past. At this 
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point, the country was no longer engaging in UN peace operalions to 
signal reliability and credibility amidst political adversity. Instead, it used 
the mission to publicize its commiunent to international stability and to 
demonstrate that it possessed sufficient leadership skills to be considered 
a so-called "global player" or "emerging power."~3 In other words, parti-
cipalion in UN PKOs is helping a transitioning slate to redefine its global 
identity. 
Yel, with a total force of almost 300,000 soldiers-roughly seven Limes 
that of Argen tina-Brazil could have deployed far mOl~e. troops than .it 
aClually comluitted.s.1 As an overall deployment, the BraZIlIan presence 1I1 
Haili, as of late 2012 (c.2,000 troops), is small compared to those of the 
largest global troop-contributing countries (TCCs). States like Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and India deploy eight times more soldiers per year than 
Brazil, while much smaller countJies, such as Nepal and Uruguay (see 
below), supply substantially more than Brazil as well. Indeed, Brazil has 
never been arnong the top five UN TCCs; as of late 2012, il sits in fOlll~ 
teenth place. 
However, Brazil not only expressed a willingness to commit and sustain 
troops in Haiti; it also signaled its intention to lead and command the 
mission and to thus go beyond its linguistic and cultural sphere of influ-
ence, and beyond a mere Chapter VI peacebuilding mission. Whereas 
Argentina was motivated to join the MINUSTAH mission to signal willing-
ness to cooperate with neighbors, Brazil was plimarily dliven by its own 
global ambitions. Certainly, the most relevant difference between Car-
doso's and Lula's foreign policies lies in the latter's willingness to act in a 
more assertive and proactive way. Lula diverged from previous democratic 
administrations in that he used Brazil's military might to accomplish 
foreign policy objectives in UN PKOs. 
Second, domestic imperatives appear to playa supporting role in Bra-
zil's peace operations strategy. In particular, the Lula administration 
sought to improve interbureaucratic coordination between soldiers and 
diplomats by forcing both establishments to workjointly in peacekeeping. 
Decisionmakers have thus come to realize that, if Brazil is to increase 
recognition of its status as a global player, it needs to synchronize the mes-
sag'es and activities of its various bureaucracies, especially its most visible 
ministries. 
Unlike the country's first phase of participation in peace operations, 
which involved no discussions about militaI1' reforms, its current engage-
ment in I-Iaili has been the subject of a much broader national debate on 
the role of the armed forces and the use of national resources. Scholars 
such as Ivani Vassoler-Froelich saw CIiticism from all sides of the political 
spectrum. Members of the intellectual community and the political left 
perceived Brazil's command.of MINUSTAH as legitimizing Washington's 
milil<111' policy in Haiti. Isolationist and nationalist groups saw the mission 
in Brazil as a diversion of resources that could otherwise be used to 
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combat poverty and crime at home. Critics also questioned the ability Of 
the armed forces to conduct peace operations effectively, given their inex_ 
pelience in the field and their limited international exposure.:>" 
On the other hand, Lula's supporters view large peacekeeping commit_ 
ments, of the kind we have witnessed in MINUSTAH, as a valuable oppor_ 
tunity to reform an anachronistic military institution. For instance, Monica 
Hirst considers Brazil's peace operations strategy as an attempt to gradu_ 
ally expose the armed forces to democracy and globalization. In places 
like Haiti, the Brazilian military is not merely a tactical supporter of Bra_ 
zil's foreign policy; it is also largely responsible for the policy's strategic 
implementation on the international stage, which is expected to force 
. diplomats and soldiers to coordinate policies, and to thereby increase 
inter-agency collaboration, or "service jointness.":l6 Ultimately, this should 
improve foreign policy cohesion at a time when Brazil is in the inter_ 
national spotlight. It should also help enhance relations between civilians 
in the Brazilian government and uniformed personnel. 
For The Economist, peace operations are a means of modernizing the 
anned forces; wi th democracy firmly eSI:c1.blished, it claims, the Brazilian 
army needs a new job and peace operations can facilitate the process.37 
Citing a Brazilian geopolitics expert, the journal claims that 
peacekeeping encourages the democratization of the militalY mindset. 
The old generation is all about war and security. In another genera-
tion we'll have a new militalY, with an international outlook and new 
ideas about conflict prevention, civilian government and the rule of 
law. 38 
Uruguay's involvement in peace operations: small country, 
hlloge contributions 
Uruguay has become one of the world's largest troop-contributing nations. 
The number of blue helmets sent to UN missions has substantially 
increased from less than 100 observers in 1982 to some 1,000 peacekeep-
ers in 1993 and over 2,500 blue helmets in 2010. In 1982, Urugl.laY partici-
pated in only two PKOs (the United Nations Milil:c1.lY Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan, UNMOGIP, and the Multinational Force Operation in 
Sinai, MFO) yet, by 2010, it was involved in at least nine different peace 
operations and today over 24,335 of the countlY's soldiers have been 
involved in at least one mission. This fact makes Uruguay the world's 
largest UN troop contributor per capita. With a population of fewer than 
four million people, there is one Uruguayan peacekeeper for every 280 
citizens. Officially, Uruguay was the eighth-largest UN troop contdbutor 
between 1990 and 2010. It is also Latin America's leading supplier of blue 
helmets. To date, Uruguay sustains three battalions in at least two concur-
rent missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, deploying 
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almosl three times more soldiers than Argentina and more than the neigh-
boring emerging power, Brazil. In fact, more than 50 percent of AJ:my 
officers and 34 percent of all non-commissioned officers have some kind 
of blue-helmet experience. Currently, on any given day, more than 10 
percent of Uruguay's total armed forces are deployed in UN PEDs around 
the world.:>!! 
Why does this small buffer state in South America supply such a large 
number of soldiers to UN PKOs? Certainly, the Uruguayan case can be 
compared to those of AJ"gentina and Brazil, based on important control 
variables. Like its two big neighbors, Uruguay undenvent a democrat-
ization process that motivated an internal interest in in ternational affairs 
(see Guyer in this volume). The three nations are also all members of the 
same subregion and have experienced similar amholitarian regimes and 
parallel democratization processes. But the similarities are not as imrigu-
ing as the differences. In contrast to the two previous cases analyzed in [his 
chapter, Uruguay has not relied on peace operations as a signaling 
strategy. Instead, participation in UN peace operations has primarily been 
Llsed to fund the armed forces and, by extension, to justify their existence 
in a democratic era. 
In order to fully understand Uruguay's involvement in UN peacekeep-
ing efforts in the 1990s, we need to assess the context of its democrat-
ization. In fact, this South American country would have never volunteered 
blue helmets had it not been for two fundamental crises within the armed 
forces themselves; namely an identity crisis and a budgetal), emergency, 
both of which were caused by the democratization process itself. 
Unlike Argentina's transition to democracy, which took place as a result 
of the collapse of the military in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, and Bra-
zil's transition to democracy, which was negotiated with the milital)" the 
redemocratization of Uruguay stemmed from domestic and international 
pressures tllat forced the military government to withdraw from direct rule 
and to hold extrication elections.10 The circumstances of Umguay's u'ans-
ition to democracy in 1985 afforded civilians both political leverage and 
influence. In contrast to Brazil, where the military and their conservative 
allies partially managed the transition, in Uruguay the democratization 
process ultimately remained in tile hands of civilians:11 Hence, the demo-
cratization process did not provide the milital)' with the degree of autonomy 
required to proactively assume the role it deemed necessary. Slowly but 
surely, civilians began to introduce an unprecedented number of initiatives 
that diminished the role and political influence of the military. 
It is in this critical domestic context that participation in UN PKOs pro-
vided an opportunity to cope with the existing institutional crisis in the 
military. The need to refonn the military's mission prompted an interest 
in peace operations, and a small window of opportunity emerged in 1991. 
That year, Venezuela accepted a UN invitation to join the peace mission 
in Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 
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UNTAC) by sending a c011lingent of approximately 1,000 peacekeepers. 
The following year, a failed military coup organized by then-Colonel Hugo 
Chavez impeded Venezuela from deploying its troops to UNTAC:12 This 
gave Uruguay the justification to assume Venezuela's role. Hence, in 1992 
"Bata1l6n Uruguay I" was deployed, consisting of close to 1,200 men, 
including Army officers and non-commissioned officers as well as Navy 
personnel. Uruguayan peacekeepers were positioned across four Cambo-
dian provinces, occupying six border patrol positions.'i3 
The government was prompted to join PKOs by economic and milital), 
considerations. Military advisors in Uruguay reasoned that UN peace opera-
tions were a relatively inexpensive mission that could divert the focus of the 
armed forces away from domestic politics and budgets to external roles. 
Peace missions thus provided an ongoing role that was more likely to be 
funded by some sort of international assistance. Decisionmakers in Uruguay 
thought that peace operations would also help alleviate budgetary ailments 
by providing both additional salaries and operational resources. Indeed, the 
military has strong monetary incentives to join UN efforts, since salaries can 
be more than tripled during peace operations selvice. 
After UNTAC, Uruguay engaged in other deployments in Africa, includ-
ing Mozambique, Angola and Congo. In fact, by 2004, the South American 
state became the leading troop contributor to the mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), providing 21.32 percent of all of the mis-
sion's miliL:'lI)' personnel. 
The engagement in MONUC indicated a gradual transformation of Uru-
guay's peace operations trajectory. Whereas in the first phase Uruguay had 
supplied contingent troops, in the second the countl)' assumed a much 
more active logistical role, taking over tasks that included not only the 
massive deployment of troops, but the provision of services for the UN peace 
operations system. For instance, in MONUC, Umguay maintains three bat-
talions responsible for air and river transportation. Army engineers have also 
been responsible for installing water treatment plants that supply drinking 
water to all UN units in the Congo.'14 As of late 2012, there are six function-
ing plants in Congo and four in Haiti.']; Gradually, Uruguay established not 
only a way of keeping its armed forces busy, but a niche special ty area within 
UN PROs that has proven to be quite profitable. 
In 2005, Uruguay became the second largest troop contributor to 
MINUSTAH, second only to Brazil, yet larger than Argentina and Chile:Hi 
The irony is that Uruguay was not originally included in the core group of 
South American states involved in MINUSTAH. This group coordinated 
the political aspect'> of participation in MINUSTAH and was formalized 
in to the "2 x 3" (later "2 x 9"; see Marconcies in this volume) coordination 
mechanism, which regularly brings together deputy ministers of foreign 
affairs and defense. The "ABC" group (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) 
excluded Montevideo, in part because the countl)' believed that it was 
already overcommitted in the Congo. 
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MINUSTAH was by no means a Mercosur initiative, although its members 
converged in Haiti by chance and then cooperated in an ad hoc manner. 
Chile (not a Mercosur member) was the pioneer state, getting involved in 
Haiti early on because of its close relationship with Washington. Brazil and 
Argentim~ followed suit. Uruguay, the largest South American peacekeeper, 
was left aside. In fact, it did not join the ABC until late 2005, when its gov-
ernment offered water treatment plants for Haiti, almost two years after 
MINUSTAH had been approved. Since then, the "ABC" has added a "+U" 
for U ruguay:17 The emerging policy convergence and defense coordination 
an-lOngst South American troop conuibutors have led scholars to believe 
that the region has now become an exporter of peace, which in part reflects 
its own experience with dictatorships and democracy.4H 
But why did Uruguay join MINUSTAH when it was already fully com-
mitted in MONUC? There are no public data available on how much 
money is paid to Uruguay for its peacekeeping services, but it does receive 
generous UN allowances. In 2010, Montevideo had, on average, close to 
2,300 soldiers abroad, participating in several PKOs. This translates inlO 
US$2.3 million per month or US$27.6 million a year just in UN allow-
ances. Uruguay's total defense budget for 2010 was US$375 million; peace 
operations reimbursements thus represent approximately S percent of the 
defense budget.·1Y This figure includes neither reimbursements for equip-
ment amortization, nor compensation received for services, such as water 
treaunent, provided to the UN. But, given that at any time 11 percent of 
the Uruguayan armed forces are abroad,5u while another 11 percent are 
training for the next deployment (troops are rotated every six months), it 
appears that peace operations help maintain at least a quarter of the force 
and may finance an even greater share. 
Uruguay therefore appears to have been more successful, in relative 
tel-ms, than Argentina and Brazil in identifying potential sources of 
income from peace operations. Its military can actually make a profit from 
the activity, since operational and salaly costs are cheaper in Uruguay than 
in neighboring countries. In this sense, peacekeeping has become a true 
mili l<ily profession, since its practitioners are being generously paid to 
perform their duties. This, of course, comes at a cost. The lack of military 
reform has raised controversy, since Uruguayan soldiers have been 
accLlsed of serio liS human rights allegations while on peacekeeping dUl}'. 
In August 2012, five blue helmets from Uruguay were accused of sexually 
abusing an IS-year-old teenage boy. An investigation is underway, and it 
rem ains to be seen if any punishment will be applied. 51 
Conclusions 
The previous sections have provided a number of possible reasons why 
Sou th American states participate in UN peace operations. The reasons 
confirm empilically that democratization is an especially potent impetus 
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forjoining UN peace missions. Peace operations have offered South Arner-
ican states the possibili ty of improving the clarity of their internal and 
external political signaling, enhancing their capacity for internal military 
reform, and increasing their defense budget<; in times of contraction, all 
of which are necessary to consolidate democracy. 
Certainly, these motivating factors have not been present at all times 
and in aU cases. As previously analyzed, some TCCs, like Uruguay, have 
been more enticed by the economic incentives of participation, while 
others, such as Argentina, have joined UN peace operations in order to 
introduce domestic reforms. 
However, this is not to say that a national-level commitment to PKOs 
will necessmily have the desired effects on military reform, foreign policy 
or defense budgets. Even if leaders in democratizing states are fully com-
milled to military reform, the effects of peacekeeping participation are 
likely to be diffused by the equally diverse motivations states pursue in 
peace operations. This, of course, raises the question of what would 
happen if a country no longer required peace operations for signaling, 
domestic reform or economic incentives. Brazil may in fact have reached 
that point. In 2011, the new Brazilian Minister of Defense, Celso Arnorim 
(fOlTIlerly Foreign Minister under Lula) , announced that his country 
would pull out of Haiti after more than seven years of MINUSTAI-I.52 This 
may effectively put an end to Brazil's-and perhaps South Arnerica's-
large peace operations contribution in a democratizing era, at least for 
now. 
Notes 
1 See, for instance, V. P. Fortna, Peace Time: Cease Fin Agreements and lhe DUTabilily 
oj Peace, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 13. 
2 See, for instance, H. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign 
Affairs 53, 1967, 425-436; L. Neack, "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Com-
munity or Self?," journal oj Peace Research 32, 1995, 181-196; and A. F. Cooper, 
Niche Diplomacy. lvliddle Powers After tlte Cold Wm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1997, pp. 1-24. 
3 E. D. Mansfield and J. C. Pevehouse, "Democratization and International 
Organizations," International Organization 60,2006,137-167. 
4 G. O'Donnell and P. C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentalive 
Concl1tsions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986, p. 6. 
5 For arguments on international signaling, see K. T. Gaubatz, "Democratic States 
and Commitment in International Relations," in M. Kahler, ed., Liberalization 
and Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 27-65; J. 
Morrow, "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Nego-
tiation in International Politics," in D. A. Lake and R. Powell, eds., Strategic 
Choice and Inlernational Relalions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, 
pp.77-114. 
6 The deployment was part of an operation sanctioned under UN Security 
Council Resolutions 661, 665, 669 and 670. 
60 11. C. Sotomayor Velia.quez 
7 J. Elchegaray, "Operaciones Milimres de Paz" ["Milital)' P~ace Op~ralions"], 
Policy paper, Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations, New 
York,january 200l. 
8 D. L. Norden, "Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's UN Missions," 
Inlemalional Peacekeeping 2, 1995, 330-3'19. 
9 R. Diarnint, "Security Communities: Defense Policy Integration and Peace 
Operations in the SOllthern Cone, An Argentine Perspective," Inlernali01wl 
Peaceilee/)ing 17,5,2010,670. 
10 In the UN nomenclature, a full battalion involves, at least, a unit of 820 staff 
officers and non-commissioned officers from diffel-ent services, usually under 
the command of a Iiemenant colonel. 
11 Data on salaries were obtained from A. L. Pala, "Peacekeeping and its Effects 
011 Civil-Milital)' Relations: The Argentine Experience," in J. I. DomInguez, 
ed., International Secwity and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in Ihe 
Post-Cotd War Era, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998, p. 13B. 
12 C. A. Watson, "Argentina," in D. S. Sorenson and P. C. Wood, eds., The Politics 
of Pea eel we ping in the Post-Cold War Era, London: Frank Cass, 2005, p. 64. 
13 See E. L1enderrozas, "Argentina, Brasil y Chile en la Reconstruccion de Haiti: 
Intereses y Motivaciones de la Participacion Conjunra" ["Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile in the Reconstruction of Haiti: Interests and Motivations of joint Parti-
cipation"), Paper presented at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American Studies 
Association, SanJuan, Puerto Rico, March 15-16, 2006; L. Micha, "Una Vision 
Imegrada de la Participaci6n Argentina en MINUSTAH" ["An Integrated View 
of Argentine Participation in MINUSTAH"], Security and Defense St-udies Review 
5, 2005, 109-129. For an analysis of Congressional debates in Argemina 
regarding peacekeeping deployments, see G. Follietti, "La Participacion Argen-
tina en Haitr: EI Papel del Congreso" ["Argentine Participation in Haiti: lhe 
Role of the Congress"], Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Soeiedad 19, 2005, 37-56. 
14 Dialllint, "Security Communities," p. 67l. 
15 Telephone interview with Professor Rut Diamint, former advisor to jose 
Pampuro, Argentine Ministry of Defense, 14 September 2008 (see contribution 
Lo this volume). 
16 D. Bobrow and M. A. Boyer, "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to 
Peacekeeping Operations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 1997, 742. 
17 See, for instance, R. U. Sennes, "Intermediate Countries and the Multilateral 
Arenas: Brazil in the General Assembly and UN Security Council Bellveen 
1980-1995," in A. Hurrell, A. F. Cooper, G. G. Gonzalez, R. U. Sennes and S. 
SiLaraman, Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Stmtegies of Intermediate States, Working 
Paper 224, vVashington, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
2000, p. 91; and S. Miyamoto and W. S. Gonc;:alves, Militares, Diplomatas e Polilica 
Exterior/Soldiers, DijJlomats and Foreign Policy}, Campinas: UNICAMP, 1991. 
18 For example, W. Hunter, Eroding Mil-itmy I1ifluence in Brazil: Politicians Against 
Soldiers, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 
19 J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Tmnsition and Consolidation: Southern 
Eu'(01'e, Soutlt America, and Post-Communist Eu'(Ope, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996, p. 169. 
20 There is an abundant literature on Brazil's aspiration to join the Security Council 
as a permanent member. See for instance E. V. Garcia, "A Candidatura do Brasil 
a I lin Assel1lo Permanente no Conselho cia Liga das Nac;:oes" ["Brazil's Candidacy 
for a Permanent Seat on the League of Nations Council"], Reuista Brasileim de 
PolitiC(! Intemacional37, 1994, 5-23; A Pereira.and A. Oliveira Filho, "0 Brasil e 0 
Conselbo de Seguranc;:a da ONU: Revelac;:oes Vinte Anos Depois" ["Brazil and the 
UN Security Council: Revelations Twenty Years Later"], Pan:eims Eslralegicas 5, 
1998, 94-120; C. Amorim, "0 Brasil e 0 Conselho de Seguranc;:a das Nac;:oes 
Democratization and commitment to peace 61 
Unidas" ["Brazil and the United Nations Security Council"], Politica Extema 3, 
1995, 3-15; E. S. Fujita, "0 Brasil e 0 Conselho de Seguranr;:a: Notas Sobre Uma 
Decada de Transir;:ao, 1985-1995" ["Brazil and the Security Council: Notes on a 
Decade of Transition: 1985-1995"], Parcerias Estrategicas 2, 1996, 95-119; V. C. 
Arraes, "0 Brasil e 0 Conselho de Seguranr;:a das Nar;:oes Unidas: Dos Anos 90 a 
2002" ["Brazil and the United Nations Secur'ity Council: From the 1990s to 
2002"], Revi.sta Brasileim de Politica Internacional48, 2005, 152-168. 
21 See A.]. S. Cardoso, 0 Brasil nas OjJerar;oes de Paz das Nar;oes Unidas {Brazil and 
United Nations Peace Operations}, Brasilia: InstitU[Q Rio Branco-Fundar;:ao Alexan-
dre de Gusmao-Centro de Estudos Estrategicos, 1998; P. R. C. T. da Fontoura, 
o Bmsil e as OjJerar;oes de lYlanuleru,:iio da Paz das Nari5es Unidas {Brazil and United 
Nalions Peace/ieejJing OjJerations}, Brasilia: 1nsli tu [Q Rio Branco, 1999. 
22 Fontoura, Bmsil. See also S. L. Aguilar, "As Forcas de Paz do Brasil: Balanr;:o" 
["Brazil's Peace Forces: Taking Slock"], in C. Brigagiio and D. Proenr;:aJr., eds., 
Bmsil e a Mundo: Novas Visoes [Brazil and the World: New ViewjJoints}, Rio de 
Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 2002, pp. 363-446; J. M. Borges and R. Couto Gomes, 
"Notas Sobre as Missoes de Paz da ONU" ["Notes on UN Peace Missions"], in 
C. Brigagiio and D Proenr;:a,Jr., eds., Panorama Brasileira de Paz e Segumllr;a {Bra-
zilian Peace and Security Panorama}, Rio deJaneiro: Hucilec, pp. 303-328. 
23 See M. Herz and P. S. Wrobel, "A Polftica de Seguranr,:a no Pos-Guerra Fria" 
["Post-Cold War Security Policy"], in Brigagao and Proenr,:a, eds., Bmsil e 0 
Mundo, pp. 255-318; P. Taylor, The British Com1Jared with Bmzi{ian Policies 
Regarding the Reform of the International Political System, with Particular- Reference to 
lhe United Nations, Paper presented during til e Seminario Brasil-Reino Unido 
[Brazil-United Kingdom Seminar], Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 18-19 September 
1997, pp. 1-32. 
24 For an analysis of Collor de Mello's and Cardoso's foreign policies, see A. S. de 
Cruz j., A. R. F. Cavakante and L. Pedone, "Brazil's Foreign Policy under 
Collor," Journal of Inleramerican Studies and vVm'/d Affairs 35, 1993, 119-144 and 
L. F. Lampreia, "A Polftica EXlerna do Gover-no FI-IC: Continuidade e Reno-
var;:ao" ["The Foreign Policy of the {Cardoso} Government"], Revisla Bmsileira de 
Politica Internacional41, 1998,5-17. 
25 T. G. Costa, "Democratization and International Integration: The Role of the 
Armed Forces in Brazil's Grand Strategy," in D. Mares, ed., Civil-Military Rela-
lions: Building Democracy and Regional Secu-rit'), in Latin America, Soulhern Asia, and 
Central Europe, Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, p. 232. 
26 See M. R. S. Lima, "Brazil's Response to the New Regionalism," in G. Mace and 
].-1'. Therien, eds., Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 137-158; M. R. Soares de Lima, "Instituir;:6es 
Democraticas e Polftica Exterior" ["Democratic Institutions and Foreign 
Policy"], Contexlo Internacional22, 2000, 265-303. 
27 See E. Solingen, Regional Orders al Century's Da.wn: Global and Domestic Influences 
on Grand Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 147-154. 
28 See T. Weiner and L. Polgree, "The Aristide Resignation: The Turmoil; Haitian 
Rebels Enter Capital; Aristide Bitler," New Yarlt Times, 2 March 2004. Available: 
http://qllery.nylimes.com/gst/flillpage.hunl?rcs=9801E7DD143FF931A35750C 
OA9629C8B63 (accessed 8 August 2012). FOI- a general overview of the peace-
keeping mission in Haiti, see W. E. Kretchik, "Haiti's Quest for Democracy: 
Historical Overview," in ]. T. Fishel and A. Saenz, eds., Callarity Building for 
Peacebuilding: The Case of Haili, Washington: National Defense University Press, 
2007, pp. 8-34. 
29 For more on the Brazilian decisionmaking process regarding the peacekeeping 
mission in Haiti, see E. Diniz, "Brazil: Peacekeeping and the Evolution of 
Foreign Policy," in Fishel and Saenz, Capacity Building, pp. 102-104:. 
62 ii. C. Sotomayor Velazquez 
30 Data were obtained by summing the yearly average for all countries' mont!1ly 
troop contributions [0 UN peacekeeping operations from 2?00-20 10., See 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping OjJerations. Facts and F:lgures for Troojl 
Contributors, 2000-2010. Available: www.un.org/en/peacekeepillg/resources/ 
statistics (accessed 8 August 2012). 
31 Ibid. 
32 There is an abundance of descriptive literature on Brazil's role in MINUSTAH. 
See L. L. Pepe and S. K Mathias, "Operaciones de Paz de las Naciones UI1~~as: 
La Perspectiva BrasilCl'ia" ["United Nations Peace Operations: The BrazIlian 
Perspective"]' Revista Fuerzas Armadas)' Sociedad 19, 2005, 57-71; D. Marcondes 
de S. N., "A Participayiio e a Cooperayiio entre as Pafses de Cone Sui em Oper-
ayoes de Paz: 0 Caso da MINUSTAI-I" ["Participation and Cooperation in 
Peace Operations between Southern Cone States: The Case of MINUSTAH"J. 
in E. Svartlllan, M. C. D'Araujo and S. A. Soares, cds., Difesa, Seguranfa In/ernac-
ional e For(as Armadas: II Encon/ro da Abed {Difense, International Secllrity and 
Armed Farces: 2nd ABED I Brazilian Defense Studies Associalion} Convention], Campi-
nas: Mercado Leu'as, 2009, pp. 169-196; D. Marcondes de S. N., "Operayoes de 
Paz e Cooperayao Regional: 0 Brasil e 0 Envolvimento SuI-americana na 
MINUSTAH" ["Peace Operations and Regional Cooperations: Brazil and South 
American Involvement in MINUSTAI-I"], Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval 15, 
2010, 25-58; R. Seitenfus, "De Suez ao Haiti: A Participar;:ao Brasileira nas 
Operar;:oes de Paz" ["From Suez to Haiti: Brazilian Participation in Peace Oper-
ations"]' in Fundayao Alexandre de Gusmao, 0 Brasil e a ONU [BraZIl and tile 
UN}, Brasilia: Fundayao Alexandl'e de Gusmao, 2008, pp. 39-58; C. Chagas V. 
B., "MINUSTAI-I and the Security Environment in Haiti: BI'azii and South 
American Cooperation in the Field," Intemational Peacekeeping 17, 2010, 
711-722; E. Diniz, "0 Brasil e a MINUSTAI-I" ["Brazil and MINUSTAH"], 
Security and Defense Studies Review 5, 2005, 90-108. 
33 FOI- a conceptual discussion of Brazil as an emerging power in peacekeeping, 
see K. M. Kenkel, "South America's Emerging Power: Brazil as Peacekeeper," 
fnternationalPeacekeeping, 17,2010,644-661. 
34 Brazil's forces include: Army, 190,000; Navy (incl. Marine Corps), 59,000; and 
Air Force, 69,480. See "Latin America and the Cadbbean," in International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Militmy Balance 2011, New York: Routledge, 
2011, p. 261. 
35 See 1. VassaJer-FroeJich, "A Self-Centered or an Altruistic International Conflict 
Me~iator: The Del~rmin"nlS of Brazil's Decision [0 Participate in the United 
NalJollS Peacekceplllg Mission in Haiti," Paper delivel'ed at the 2007 Inter-
national Studies Association Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 28 Februar)'-3 
Mat'Ch 2007, pp. 5-9. 
36 M. Hirst, "La Intervenci6n Sudamericana en Haitf" ["The South Amedcan 
Intervention in Haiti"], in M. Hirst, ed., Crisis del Estado e In/eruencion Internac-
lonal: Una lHirada desde el Sur (The Crisis of tlte Stale and Intemational Intervention: 
, ;'1 Vll"I.U from tite SoU/it], Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2009, pp. 338-339. 
37 Brazil Takes Off," proclaimed the cover of the November edition of Tlte Ear 
~Wlll~(. See Tlte Ec~nomist, "Brazil Takes Off," 14 November 2009, p. 15. Avail-
<lble. w\vw.economlst.com/ node/ 14845197?stol)' _id=E 1_ TQRQVTJS (accessed 
8 August 2012). 
38 See ."Braz~1 and Pe~cekeeping: Policy, Not Altruism," The Economist, 25 
Septembel 2010. AvaJlable: W\l/w.economist.cam/node/I7095626 (accessed 8 
August 2012). 
39 ~Illel'view with ~eneral Hector R.Islas, Director General of the School of the 
Arms and SerVices, and Lt. Colonel Pablo Pintos, Director of the School of 
Pe;a-cekttpi¥~g O~~fati~)ft.~ ~H the Se-ho-t.a.l ~f ~he }\~~n,"~ aT~d &~~~k';f'~ Ur~~~¥a}~£ 
",-\r~ny." MurH"e~idet.l", tJruEUay ~ 8 AUFust 2~1{13., 
~~. ,"'It'" ~~ a 
40 St":e finl: Hn:~i S-tq~n" r,\~"iii!m:,~~ p~ 159-; tit. {.:aef~1rn~~ and J~ Ri~~~." J~j~:r£t*":' HEf~~if.! ~k 
fa _lJi~"t~-~i~'..it'€ fl~~ jli~:li~'FJ~ ~·~.t f~e ft~l~gt~~TS1{fil·tl-e i\f[.~nte%~i{~K!;, Ufn';~da}: ~~&;:li~~;>£.:: 
f> • '-" 'r' "~ ,-~ ~" l.'$3!H.1-.l t.-§lt~fHa~". .... i~"11:;. pp~ L~i.;:},. 
41 Un"l" ~rudSte~1&n~", ~~."%~~'m.~ ~}.~)" 1~~~-159,. 
42 On \len~:lu~~a~s' ~~~He~t ~H"te;npt to i-~~T~i{i~)&e in UN t~ace ~t~i~::$n!. a~1:,,;;i ~~t~ 
~Hl_elnpt>i."il :('.{'uq".} i'~fg·an~.£ed hy Ch~i\e~;'o ~~~i.~ C.;. A- R~)!nep.~ -';';f:'~fK~tcrtciug P.:ea':€.-e ~w 
C.l:ther A:Ieans:: vt.~n~~tu,~~~~/~ iil L"h:ln1~!lg~ie£,~ l'~d~~TI'.:f,i"ih~:,;~,t.[IM:~}-~~ P!~ i5~-I~~ 
43 Lkttg:uay,. Ann}'. 15,1 Ejitlif,-' L§,,~'U'J~' £R Mi~i:m,.'$ -if",' Pig tim;; [Tcn.,£:~":J.""-"" i!:;-'*'..W i,. 
J~~f.~:' }ifi.:f:1i:&1isi~ ~li,,}nte\?i:{~.)-; ~ifn:,,:-iH') de Ia Rt'l~tH~~;:;& ~:k~j ~Jrug:&'~l!\ ~~J~~~~ 
£-~~'} PI"· ,}& ' .... 
. < .. ,,, , 1- ,-"> ~~., '. "'<'. - <, ~.> 
.:.n t.l'n f.tle ~)n~gu;:'t}~1§"$ ~:rt~tnte~nt plants::- see 't."", ~.!-"" i'~ngele:.tQ~ "_~i~"'"e~~ iLti."'.;as t'~n~$ 
l~otabHi:illtio~~. t.~·~nn .. ~~ctaS- V Tfan,,~I.x}rtat~les~ [~)iFi~&n ~)f ~b~ Ct ... ~~l1~~"%. ~U'~j ~ ~ r ~ ~ 
Port~b~e \\r~~te~~ S}SrealS"''']:-e Fti:~i~1~1-1:"'l ")Q~~'1",i'i;~~ N~J\~:fnhet~ 2tl\}R AtJi"~g~a~~{",: ~~~W~ 
ingenieli()Srn~Ji~~~r~":s..,{:rrg"l~Y./~·R*njcas_/~-t-:nJ!;i~ica21_unn (aC't.~~ 8 ,;i'\~~~~li.1 ~JI2~,. 
4;. -C~:I~'3- ~to~:'{~ ",i~ s...""," .. ~~,,"-o:.·ids::-ti v r!t"~e:p\:~" -=n Aq.,t::!it~!l L:~t~n:3; ~S'e":t~'F;r;:!:,~' .,,--,,~i'~ {}.~.~~i:;~~~ _ Jt,:' ..... .{\. ....... """' .... ""'~~b"':li:;,- '..,~ . -,.~ ... ~>- "0.,' __ -olo~ -,'" """'~ '!;;. ....... '~~-;;~_ ".,,"'-""~ ' ..... '"' .. ~-.;>-l~~I';;., 
Net\\?t'n{~ ~n L~ttin ,An:K~rjt~tl (Rl:'3t),,-\L};o /ith~' i:~)~oo~~ti~~ ~k~ ~~ I~~~~~§.~--g ~~ ;,d,~~~i;i§f 
L~ti~a "i' ~f t:'::~~~i~-e i(~w..~~1?Jh~~" .lilk~\' i[}f~~;~,,:~:s~~ in Li&Q~ i~l*~U?l' fJi~;1..~ ~. (:~!$r~~~~~'4 
'l"~"'~;: ,,-,=-- ",~s:"",,;, "}"H) '''''~;'ahie< ''',,?\.~' ~""~} ... ~ ,-,-".,.l".b"l·",~h",M" o".'''''''''~ U'-~"-,3.-Jo\.::;"~ n;;r~'1t..~ ~ ..... u.~~"..,- ~'\.~.Jt,,,,-~-oO -><'~~=.E:t. ~_ ._ ~'" "_.''''''''''t..._'U,=..:,'t,~~,~ "."'-O> .... =$'''''"''~, .. ''''''''''-.::.':(~'''''''~,;..,.. ..  
u,tl1%1)ay",p{if {~tteS5x.··.d S "tluguSt 2i}f21'> 
46 Accmyjin£: ~n ~iH": da.t;'t a,,·< .. ~bbk ff'.nn the",: UN I'kpartrnem. nf Pe<l{ .. ~k"",-~~.1':' 
()penttio;;s; puh~ish€''fl in Df.:cefnbe~t ~~f201~l~ Rr'a~i~:>< U~·UgH~1'.¥tc N\:pa~)i- i\fgen~~: 
f·,>-'>···~"",u'l!. "~:h;~.,· ,>,'~ .• h~ ~"r'"'>,,! 'n""·.n-·'"fl>'l{.~,-... p}t'n'~~" ;in l\.J:l')'~t r~T!i&~ 'C""-= .J\.l'"::Ui:t::t~ "~3' ........... -.... ......... .,.""-'l;. • .,;:;<." .... ';ii.l<_,",'i;;.. ~""''''h'''''~''' Ot:i ~~\;..;-l~-l:~ ... -i\..lt l!' {:< ".'1.- ~.li:3'!i-""~~ "",-,,,,, ~,_~;';,"'iij~"'-.-'-;>O-$$~,," -'"'-Wii_ .... ~ 
thrif~~i ~'\~t.~']l~f l.~~~}tk?l~'<;~i. 4' l-~itU~~j.:~~pi'§15 {)f~,,:n~~~'i~,;@R~ w.~b; a~.:i ~~~"UJ'~~<'; ... t;'~w 'l~"i..*? 
(.~n:lll1~·uJ~W$,." Ih~:~::eull~et~ ~~~l{t ,i\,"';;lH~d::~ie: \~"\"'w·~:{~n,.{Jrg/en/pf.:'3'f.~ft·~Mttg/­
l·t:'$OUtl':''l:.''S/statis~lQ~/a~ntTil:~UH)rs_archiv~::_shtHd (~"tt-~~e~eL~ g AU~'"U$,;t ~112}" 
.. ,- S n n.' , .. """". "f" -~ -, ~ > '" "~'Ii ,,-,.,. 
--t I .> e-e EL :L;;;£atl~uiit."to ",. £:.:~ ~;'~'::.f~ uu~ ~n(:tplente t. .. {.):nnHlHl.a~..t 1Je se,g-Ul:~~tit~ ii.~'~n j~~".!'Elnsr~ 
L ~ -';('I! r ..... ..---'" .". -"\, <-"" '" • .,. ~ , .. -., ....' f - ,~~ 0- -~. atn'l3f t. j ~l;e ~>:,~1'!, an }n{.~!})~ern ~=:CUf;[ty L:t)nlLU1Ull~ llJ ~a:¥.H·~ fu~M:::~rri%A:f" l" 
n l' '" r' • - ",.n ",.,,-. "', < .~., '* n._ • -'''''---
.I' ('l~H.--:r pap,e!- :fli)c~ !h\ ~:n:e(H"$:C:d £..ue!Rt ,>-~IUl:tng" _~l'flt:!a1i'?;)::;, t-.. n~,,"e-:-o L~1t.eR~&~ 'Zt~~ff .. 
AV'a~Iatl1e;: j~ttr~:./i'/Iibr~~ryj{:.s .. de~/pd;f:ril~_"'5/hH:e§~/~h-5it'.gH,rtti:~,f"5{B%Jl"l~:ir 
i .. ,>--,,=<,,~~ .~ ." "<,~.,,, "<l1P"}'~ '\'~;;!t--"'1;-""''' '"p:'ll,-~'->"'''''-~''''~',. "., .. , '{<tLH'l;.S -\":O:O'\..~_"~",-",-,,,- ~ S1.i=,e..:!i'.>it--.,,,,, _", ~=-$-" .. ~i""..;!", u""----~ _,. ~.t.oi<~>i'l:;O'';:;".~''''''~-!' ;t.~~ .. ""~ ..... ' ~ ..... ~ .. -c 
48 D!illnint<.~ ~\;&t::uxi~~ (:~"}liUlIU1!itie~""·~ f~> 6twJ.; ~m~J HifS~~ '·~lnte!"\'~~.:i~Sn $&l'f.ia~l£.~i-
"'e"~ ~:-:r-,~,~'"' ana. p_ ,':}.:."~:l'.. 




,. < < .... ,~< 'n"< ,~< <.-"" J 'HT ." ~ ." ~"' 
.dlle-l"'¥le'\v '1it~i~s~ ~ __ .;;{.*~re~ E\.~lU~ t."'fU~X~(Hu<:~}S~y*, 1'Wdd:t"".iury h.~~ue at tne _l"it~1;llane:t~t 
Mission of Uruguay to the United Nations, New York, 3 July 2003, Gloodtdofsky 
is a former commander of UNMOGIP, Interview witl! Colonel Picabea, Army 
General Staff Office, Uruguayan Army, Montevideo, Uruguay, 5 August 2003, 
See Canadian Haiti Action Network, "Uruguayans and UNASUR discuss Haiti 
military occupation force known as MINUSTAH." Available: www.canaclahaiti-
action,ca/content/uruguyans-and-unasur-discuss-haiti-military-occupation-
force-known-minustah (accessed 8 August 2012). 
See BBC News Latin America, "Brazil plans Haiti peacekeeping withdrawal, says 
Amorim," BBC News, 6 September 2011. Available: www.bbc.co,uk/news/world-
latin-america-14812500 (accessed 8 August 2012). 
